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There is an extensive literature on why andJiow localized labor markets may
lead to a general concentration of economic activities in geographic space
(Fujita/ Thisse 1995). The question how a localization oflabor markets comes
about has been much less studied and has only recently found increased interest
(CEPR). The most prominent of these recent efforts is Krugman's model on
labor market pooling (Kmgman 1991) referring to Marshall's argument that an
industrial center allows a pooled market for workers with specialized skills,
such a pooled market benefiting both workers and firms. Assuming that there
are firm specific demand or productivity shocks and increasing returns on the
firm level the pooled labor market protects firms from labor shortages in good
times and workers from being unemployed when the current employer is
suffering from negative shocks.
In this paper we look at the localization of labor market localization from a
different perspective. It is based on a model oflabor turnover that does not rely
on product market shocks. Rather, there is uncertainty about the value of
individual employment relationships. This uncertainty does not refer to laborheterogeneity or agency problems but to an unknown productivity of workers
who are ex ante identical (or unknown nonpecuniary characteristics of a job).
This allows for modeling labor turnover which not only explains separation
decisions on the part of the employer but also quit decisions by the employees.
The more employment opportunities exist in the immediate neighborhood of
the residential location of a worker the less likely it is that the worker has to
bear the costs of a residential relocation when quitting or loosing a job. The
more workers with desired skills live near the location of a firm the easier it is
to fill a vacancy after a separation due to a negative work history
The employer and the worker agree to make the wage dependent on the
observed history of productivities. As the hiring of another worker or to find
another employment is associated with transaction costs neither the employer
nor the worker can commit to a wage offer or a wage demand, respectively.
Therefore, wages have to be decided upon by bargaining (Diamond 1971,
McMillan/Rothschild 1994). Taking account of the conceptual (e.g.
Fudenberg/Levine forthcoming, Binmore et al. 1996) as well as empirical
criticism of non-cooperative bargaining theory (e.g.Spiegel/Currie/Sonnenschein/Sen 1994) based on the results of experiments, a
evolutionary bargaining model is adopted (Young 1993b).
The labor turnover has been previously modeled in the search theoretic
models of Jovanovic (1979a, 1979b), Wilde (1979), Viscusi (1979), Johnson
(1978) and Mortensen (1986). In these models a job is an "inspection good":
Either the true distribution of labor productivities is unknown and the workers
get paid according to the expected average productivity, given the observed
history of her/his performance, or they learn about non-pecuniary
characteristics of the job which might make them switch to another
employment. They all focus on the modeling of quit decisions; the employers
pay the average product and are therefore indifferent between having a worker
with a low or high performance. Separation decisions of employers and
workers are studied in Lippman/McCall (1981) and McCall/McCall (1985).
The consequences of the cost of turnover for wage determination are not taken
into account.
The externality arising from the clustering of workers and employers in the
context of job uncertainty has not been studied before. A similar argument has
been made for goods markets where the clustering of suppliers creates ademand externality using standard search theoretic modeling techniques
(Wolinsky 1983).
In the next section we discuss how the employers and workers solve the
bargaining problem on how to divide the surplus created by a match without
knowing the preferences of their bargaining partners or the probability
distributions thereof. In section three we present the turnover model assuming
that the value of a match is uncertain and that information over its probability
distribution is only acquired in the course of the tenure. Section four discusses
how the costs of switching an employment relation and the costs of residential
relocations influence the separation decisions. This allows to determine the
agglomerative force of a cluster of employers and the conditions for a single
cluster equilibrium.
2 Wage and profit determination
As set out in the introduction a job is considered to be an experience good.
There is no ex ante information on the specific value of a employment
relationship. Employers have no information on the valuation of the job by the
worker and vice versa. Nor do they have (common) knowledge of the
distribution of tnie productivities of comparable jobs. Given that switching ajob and employing a different worker is costly they cannot commit to a certain
wage offer or wage demand. Due to the lack of ex ante information on the types
of employers and workers a labor contract cannot be derived from first
principles as in cooperative bargaining solutions (Nash 1953, Raiffa 1953) or as
the subgame perfect equilibrium of a game in which the players alternate in
making offers to one another (Stahl 1972, Rubinstein 1982 and Binmore et al.
1992). To find an agreement on how to divide the surplus created by a job they
have to rely on information that is obtained by looking at similar arrangements
and appeal to what is usual in similar situations.
To model what employers and workers may consider as "usual" and how
this helps them to coordinate we rely on the evolutionary learning models of
Kandori et al. (1993), Samuelson (1994) and Young (1993 a,b). Learning does
not occur at the individual level out of a bilateral interaction as it is assumed
that after a separation of an employment relation the worker does not return to
the same employer. It is assumed that each individual has limited information
on how the benefits of similar matches have been divided in the past.
Coordination arises if the employers and workers refer, initially by chance, to
the same precedents. As this establishes a set of common precedents theindividuals begin to expect that similar coordination problems will be solved in
the same way in the future. If there is only little variability in agreements due to
differences in the agents' behavior and beliefs the process will lead to one
division rule that will be observed almost all of the time.
Employers and workers are considered as two finite, nonempty classes of
individuals A and B. In each period an agent can only meet one member of the
other class to decide on a labor contract specifying a division rule. In an
ongoing employment wage payments depend on the actual performance of the
worker according to this division rule.
The share demanded by the worker is denoted by y, the share of the
employer by x. Only a finite number of divisions is considered. D denotes the
set of feasible (positive) demands whose precision is measured by 10~
p with p
being a positive integer. Employers and workers are randomly matched.
Matched employers and workers then play a Nash demand game: Members
of A demand a fraction x e D and a member of B a fraction y e D of the
surplus of the match which will be determined by a periodic assessment of the
performance of the worker. The demands are satisfied if x +y < 1. If x + y > 1
both get nothing and have to wait to be matched again.The demands (xt,yt) form a precedent. The whole set of precedents with t
elements is denoted by
Some of the precedents become outdated or irrelevant such that only the last m
records survive.
s(x,y)={(x^m,1,yt_UHl),(xt_m+2,y1_m+2),...,(xl,yt)[
Let an employer a and a worker p be chosen as the match t+1. Having neither
information or beliefs about the utility function of the other side nor on the
distribution of utility functions over the whole population they decide on their
demands by relying on a subset of the above precedents that they happen to get
to know.The employer draws a random sample of size ki; and the worker a
random sample of the size kw from these m records, kj (j = E,W) measures the
degree to which the individuals are informed. Each agent then chooses a best
reply to her/his observed frequency distribution of demands. The employer a
forms the cumulative frequency distribution F(y) on the demands made by the
workers in his sample:
V y e D F(y) = h/krt iff the sample contains exactly h demands of yj < y.The employer is assumed to have a v.Neumann Morgenstern utility function
uf;(x) which is concave, stnctly increasing in the employer's own share and
defined for all x e [0,1]. The utility functions are normalized such that the
utility of a disagreement is equal to zero, i.e. iii (0) = 0. If a demands x and p a
share of y the employer gets x if y < (l-x) and zero otherwise. That is, the
expected utility, given the sample information, is
u,.;(x)F(l-x) + u,.;(0)[l-F(l-x)] - u,r(x)F(l-x). (1)
In game t+1 that demand x is chosen which maximizes the expected utility:
x,+i = argmax uH(x)F(l-x). (2)
If the solution is.not unique each of the solutions is chosen with positive
probability.
In the same way the worker draws a sample of size kw at random from the
last m plays and chooses an optimal response to the demands of the employers.
The response rules just described determine a stationary Markov chain. The
state space consists of sequences s of length m whose elements are the
surviving precedents of the demand game. pi-(x s) denotes the conditionalprobability of the demand x iff x is the best reply by a to a sample of size kK
drawn from s.
Every pair of an employer with a vacancy and a worker seeking
employment have a positive probability 7t(a,P) of being matched
1 which
depends on the switching behavior as will be explained in section 4.
Given a state s = {(x,.m+i,yt-nl+i), (xt.m+2,yt_m+2),.--, (xt,yt)) another state s' is
said to be a successor of s if it has the form s' = !(xt.m+2,yi-m+2),•••- (xt,yt),
(Xi+i,yi+i)}. Depending on the precision of the demands, the memory m, the
relative sample sizes of the agents k/m (j = E,W) as well as the best reply
distributions PH(X | S) and pw(y I s), the transition probability that the process
will move from state s to a successor s' with the completion of the Nash
demand game t+1 is
(P)p,(,+1|)pw(yl+I|) (3)
If a fixed division (x,l-x) were repeated m times, the Markov process defined
by (3) reaches an absorbing state. After arrival in such a state every employer
In other cases than the one discussed here the matching probability may depend on the geographic
distance between the locations of the agents, the matching probability decreasing with communication or
transportation costs. Here we assume that the information on job opportunities is not dependent on the
distance between the residential location of a job seeker and the location of a potential employer10
observes that workers demand (I-x) and the unique optimal reply is to demand
x > 0. Similarly the workers find that in all the demand games they sampled the
employers claimed a share of x of the surplus generated by the labor relation.
Hence, their best reply is (1-x) > 0. Consequently, after agreement t+1 the
process is in the same state as after game t. As has been shown by Young
(1993a,b, 1995 Theorem 1) the process indeed converges with probability one
to such a division rule if the relative sample size in-each class is sufficiently
small, or more precisely smaller than or equal to half of the surviving records.
However, process (3) does not tell to which division rule the process will
finally.converge. It has as many absorbing communication classes as there are
pure strategy Nash equilibria, i.e. division rules.
The evolutionary process defined in (3) is based on the assumption that
agents always choose best replies given their information. For the sake of
realism (and to avoid that the process settles down on local rather than global
optima) it is assumed that agents experiment by choosing sometimes other than
best reply strategies or make mistakes. Let e be the absolute probability with
which agents in general experiment and A+; and Kw the relative probabilities
with which particular agents experiment. qi;(x I s) be the conditional probabilitythat a chooses the reply x given tht a is experimenting and that the current state
is s. qp(y s) is analogously defined for the workers, qw and qw are assumed to
have full support to ensure that in any given situation all demands can be made
with positive probability. The additional assumptions on experimentation lead
to revised transition probabilities of moving from state s to s' at time t+1:
eA |',sB
- ^a)(l - eA.p)pa(x|s)pp(y|s) +
+ eX|1(l - eA.(x)pa(x|s)q,,(yjs) + (4)
P
KSS' = 0 if s' is not a successor of s. The process P° is identical to the
unperturbed process (3). If s is positive the perturbed process P
c is irreducible
(all states communicate with each other) because of the assumption that the
experimental distributions qn, qw have full support. This implies that P
t
: has a
unique stationary distribution in.
1'. As the process is also aperiodic (positive
recurrent) it is strongly ergodic: For every s e S, \.i'- is the relative frequency
with which state s will be observed in the first t periods as t -» co. Hence, if the
agents occasionally experiment the process has no absorbing states. It has been
shown (Young 1993a), however, that lim, (Oj.i'
:(h) = u°(h) exists, where j/ is a12
stationary distribution of the unperturbed process P°.That is, if E is very small,
the unique stationary distribution of P'
: is close to some particular stationary
distribution of P°. These conditions define the emergence of a stable division
rule: If lim,. >0 u'(h) = f.i"(h) > 0 exists the division rule implied is called
stochastically stable, if lim,._0 u'
:(h)= 1, it is strongly stable. A strongly
stochastically stable division rule will be observed almost all of the time if e is
small
The particular strongly stochastically stable division rule can be computed
by using graph theoretic techniques. This also allows to show that a strongly
stable division rule exists for all parameter values (cf. Appendix).
3 Learning about the value of a job and the expected tenure
Both parties consider the output as random. In accordance with the sampling of
precedents of the Nash demand game as a device to coordinate on a labor
contract they periodically assess the value of the match. The worker's realized
output provides a noisy signal for the average output for the future tenure. This
information is used to set the current wage, is a predictor of future incomes and
is the basis of possible separation decisions. The wage is equal to the expected13
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match value times the share the employer and the worker have agreed upon on
the basis of the evolutionary bargaining process described in the previous
section. The conditional predictor of the future productivity becomes more and
more precise with the duration of the employment relation as a consequence of
the law of large numbers. The workers can leave the current employer at any
time and switch to another of the ex ante identical jobs, depending on the
general labor market situation and the efforts the workers and employers
undertake to find a new job or to fill a vacancy. The value of quitting is the
expected present value of future earnings on the first day of any new job. Once
separated the worker will not return Therefore, the probability that the worker
will leave even if the tme average match specific productivity is higher than in
any other job is positive as a consequence of the sampling variation.
It is assumed that the productivities of the worker can take one of N values
zi,z2,...,zN. Similar to the sampling that the agreement on the division rule was
based on, the underlying distribution is multinomial with unknown values
7ii,7i2, ...,TIN, 7Ti > 0, L, 7i i = 1 The prior distribution on 711,712,- ,7tN is Dirichlef
with parameters ai,0C2,...,(XN. The expected prior distribution is multinomial
: The Dirichlet specification is chosen for case of exposition. A more general learning rule which would
lead to the same qualitative results has been presented by Bikchandani and Sharma (1996).14
with parameters a./Zotj. As the family of Dirichlet distributions is a conjugate
family for observations which have a multinomial distribution (DeGroot 1970,
ch. 9) the posterior distribution of 7t|,7t2,...,^N after observing productivity Zj is
Dirichlet with parameters ai,a2,...,ocj+!,...,GCN. The underlying expected
posterior distribution is multinomial with updated parameters
(ai/Zjaj+l,...,ai+I/Iljaj+l,...,aN/ZjCCj+l). In the limit the true underlying
distribution would be known with certainty.
In the context described, stopping corresponds to quitting the job. Let t > 0
be the worker's tenure on the job. {zt} represents the stochastic process
generating the time path of realized productivities as long as the worker stays
with the employer.
At time t the employer and the worker have observed the productivities
Z],Z2,...,zt. A strategy o is a decision rule which tells the searcher whether to
continue the job after observing this sequence of values or to quit the job and
search for another one. It does so for all possible sequences. To each possible
sequence of values the decision rule assigns a peculiar stopping time which is a
random variable whose probability distribution will depend on the searcher's
beliefs and on the strategy a. Alternatively, the strategy can be presented in15
terms of a reservation value. If a productivity lower than the reservation value
is observed there will be a separation decision and the initialization of another
employment relationship.
Proposition I: The solution to the search problem of finding the true value of
the match has the properties that there is
(i) a decreasing value of continuing the job,
(ii) an optimal quitting rule which is myopic and has the reservation value
property,
(in) a finite expected time of continuing the job,
(tv) an increasing sequence of reservation values.
Proof: At the beginning of a work history the employer and the worker agree on
a wage that refers to public information of similar jobs. In making a quit or
continuation decision this is translated into an accounting value z() by
multiplying it with the inverse of the shares agreed upon. It is assumed that the
searcher expects a match value for the first period after an assessment has been
made that is higher than the threshold value that would make him quit all of the
time, given that the first wage is chosen" by reference to public information like16
the wage statistics. It is first shown that the value of continuing the job is a
decreasing function'of the length of the tenure. Let us define
Ttj =—— as the initial belief of the searcher of the probability with which a
i
productivity z, will be observed. Let 1 / ]Ta ] be denoted by p. To exclude that
the searcher anticipates job switches all of the time we have to assume that the
value of the productivity z0 is not higher than what the worker expects to be the
first observation in the series of productivity assessments, i.e.
N
z0 <8^^izi . Starting from any period t the maximal gain the worker can
expect from continuing the job is the one that results when the highest
productivity zN is observed all of the time. The undiscounted expected payoff
after T periods is then
The undiscoimted total expected payoff after T+l periods is17
T+l





i + p-y • - 1+p
which is clearly smaller than the gam of observing one more ZN after period 1.
If the undiscounted value of continuing the job is decreasing over time, this
holds a forteriori for the discounted value. From this follows that the longer the
tenure lasts the more and more attractive get the alternatives. A consequence of
this fact is that with wage levels (determined by the history of productivity
observations) close to the initial wage level of a new job, quitting becomes
more and more attractive as the expected value of getting productivity values at
the upper end of the spectrum becomes more and more unlikely given the
reduced uncertainty about the tme productivity distribution of a certain match.
Therefore, if the expected payoff of continuing the job in the next period is
lower than what the searcher would expect when quitting today, and if this
difference is smaller than the difference between the observed productivity18
value z, and Zo, she/he should leave the job today. Let us assume that the next
productivity value will not be lower than the productivity value of today and
that this value occurs with probability p( = ^7T, and with complementary
/j<Z,
probability the maximal value ZN will be observed. The quitting criterion would
then be
z, -z() < 8{p,z, +(l-p,)zN -ptzt -(l-pt)zN},or
z, -zo+8p,(zN -z,)
S(zN -zt)
The right hand side is the higher the higher the current expected productivity is
above what is implied by the initial wage level and the smaller the difference
between the highest productivity and the current expected productivity. The
greater the right hand side the less probable it is that an improvement in the
expected productivity level will occur. Denoting the right hand side by r, an
upper bound for the length of the tenure is then given by
), . (9),19
where si denotes the sum of the initial Dirichlet distribution over the values
lower or equal to what is expected for the first period, s denotes the total of the
parameters of the Dirichlet distribution.
Let f\(z) be the undiscounted expected net gain of switching to another job
in period t+1
The hj denote the frequencies with which the Zj have been observed and hence
sum up to t+1.
Since in period T* the continuation of the job stops for sure the searcher should
stop in period T*-l if z*. ,- Zo < 8fr-i(z). We then define a function
g(z)=(s+t)[zl-z(1-5ft(z)]._ (11)
For all t, g(z) < 0 for z = Zn, and therefore the set Qt =•• 'z e JZI,Z2,...,ZN)
gt(z) < 0J is non-empty. Let ct denote the maximum of all z e Qt. g is
decreasing in t. because of the multiplicator (s+t) and an increasing ft, and
increasing in z. Therefore, l{ are increasing with t.20
Figure 1 Reservation values as a function of observed productivities and
0 mber of observations^
t
S
That is, the reservation values of observed productivities which cause a
separation in case they are undercut by the observed sample values increase
over time. The reason for the increasing reservation values is the "preference
for risk" of the searchers: The existence of the quit option allows the worker to
avoid low value realizations. As a consequence they prefer dispersion in the
future values because only the higher realizations are relevant. As the expected
value of continuing a job declines because of the decrease of the expected
variance of observed productivity values the reservation value is a strictly
increasing function of the sample size.21
4 The interdependence of quit and residential location decisions
In order to model the localization of the labor market we have to add structure
to the above model of wage determination and separation behavior.
As a first step the transaction costs of switching the job are detailed. Instead
of assuming that the worker who quits a-job can immediately find an alternative
employment for sure we suppose that the probability of encountering an
employment opportunity depends on the worker's search intensity sw e [0,1]
and the intensity SK with which the employers seek to fill their vacancies as well
as on the ratio of vacancies to job seekers. If the worker does nothing to find a
new job the probability that she or he will be contacted is equal to
N •
s^ = —— sr , where Nr. denotes the number of vacancies and Nw the number Nw •
of unemployed. The total probability of finding an employment opportunity is
then
c • — c -I- ' •22
The higher the intensity of search the higher will be the cost of search. We
define a cost function c = c(sw) with c' > 0 and c" > 0. The convexity of the
search cost function ensures that an optimal sw* and SK* exists as the quitting
value becomes a strictly concave function of the search intensity.
The evolution of the number of job vacancies and job seekers is the result of
the equilibrium turnover resulting from the above model of separations and on
the initial number of agents of each type. To concentrate on the issues of
localization it is assumed that the flows of vacancies and job seekers are
constant over time. This implies that the endogenous rate of the initialization of
labor relations is equal to the number of separations.
In addition to these search costs a worker is assumed, to incur costs of a
residential relocation if she or he cannot find an employment in the immediate
neighborhood. An immediate neighborhood is defined as a point in geographic
space. While the search costs of finding another job are assumed to be
independent of the geographical distance between the residential location of the
worker and the location of the prospective employers the costs of relocation are
assumed to be linearly dependent on the distance between the initial and the
new workplace.23
To determine the localization effect of these conditions we assume the
following geographic structure: A worker searches for a job from a location
where he cannot find (further) employment opportunities. This location is called
A. There is one location with just one potential employer, B, and a third
location C with (NH- 1) relevant job vacancies. The distance between his initial
residential location and point B is denoted byD»,. the distance to C by Dc and
the distance between B and C by A
Fig 2: Residential location and locations of employment opportunities
C
A localization effect would be assessed when there is a configuration of
relocation costs and expected careers such that a job seeker would reject an
offer should that offer happen to from the single firm location.24
Proposition 2: For a number of potential employers N/.: greater than some
Nh:* there exists a distance A(N/.;*) 0 such that if A A(N/.;*) every worker
with a difference in mobility costs smaller than t(D(- Da) prefers to watt for a
job offer in the cluster.
The decision whether to accept or-reject a job offer in the B depends on
whether the worker expects to quit during his remaining work life, how the
level of income that she/lie expects on that first job in B compares to the
income in the cluster C and on how large the difference in migration costs is.
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with j = B,C and zt+i denoting the expected value, given the history of observed
productivities up to period t.
The above variable r derived under optimistic assumptions on the career in
equation (8) then reads25
K.
H (z»-c(sw)-tDj) + 8(zN-zt+1)
N-
J _ ___. (13)
5(zN-z0)
As can be seen from equation (9) the duration of the tenure is a positive
function of r. Therefore the expected length of the tenure depends positively on
the
 :
- the number of vacancies,
- cost of switching the job,
- the distance of prospective migration and the cost of migration per distance
unit,
and negatively on
- the search intensities, and
- the number of job seekers.
Therefore, the expected time of continuing the job in location B is greater
than the one expected for location C. From equation (9) using equation (13) we
can calculate upper bounds for the length of these time periods, TB and Tc. The
difference in net discounted income between accepting a job in B or waiting for
a job offer in C consists oft26
- the cost of unemployment as the job seeker cannot expect to immediately
getting a job in C after turning down an offer in B,
- the lower income in B after Tc due to his lower reservation value because of
the migration costs,
- the difference in the costs of residential relocations,
- the possible unemployment after quirting the first job in C. should he again
get a job offer in B.
The expected waiting time of getting a job in the cluster after having turned
down a job offer in B is equal to the smallest integer k such that
sw
 +~Tr
 SE I -*•
An upper bound for the cost of unemployment Z(J is then calculated,
assuming as before that the expected match values are not declining and if




From the end of the prospective occupation in location C, Tc to the end of the
job in location B the job seeker expects the discounted maximum total income
z» __ £ f §' yKZ , S'fr-Tcfr
JP
For the same time penod the expected income in location C, the job seeker has
instead just started a new job and expects earning
(16)
Moving directly to the cluster the job seeker has to incur higher mobility costs
proportional to the difference between Dc and DB. As she/lie will always refuse
to move to location B he gains 5
T"tA as there is no relocation between B and C.
The total benefit of rejecting a job offer at the single firm location is then
M = Zl,1(. -Z^.T(. -Zu -t(Dc -Dn) + S
T"tA. (17)
The greater A, the longer will be the continuation on the job m location B and
the longer will be the period Tc - TB . The longer that period the higher will be
the difference between the first two terms on the right hand side of (17). The
higher the number of job opportunities in the cluster the lower is Zu and the28
higher is M. Hence there is a decreasing schedule A(N|.;) for which M = 0. The
higher the difference between the distances between location B and C the lower
is the critical distance A(N[.*), corresponding to indifference between accepting
a job in B or in C. From this follows directly Proposition 3.
Proposition 3: //M;* is such that hi >() even for the case D{- A - Dg all job
seekers within a distance of Dc around C will reject offers in B. If the radius
/)(• includes all of the geographical area considered there is a single cluster
equilibrium.
5 Employers' separation decisions and firm location
Employers decide on the separation from a worker in the same way the worker
decides on a quit decision. The observation of low productivities imply low
profits for the employer. The decreasing variance of the expected productivites
implies an increasing reservation value for continuing the employmet
relationship on the part of the employer. Who first makes a separation decision
depends on the initial beliefs of the parties on the distribution of productivity
values.29
In the above geographical situation, given that workers have reason to reject
job offers in a single firm location, an employer could not profitably locate a
firm outside the cluster. A change of a given geographical situation could result
from differences in the growth of clusters which could lead to apnipt changes of
the agglomerative force of a cluster.
6 Conclusions
The paper investigates the condition of localized labor markets when there is
uncertainty about the quality of labor market matches. As the separation of an
employment relation is costly the terms of a labor contract have to be
determined by bargaining. As there is no common knowledge of the employers'
and workers' utility functions (or their distribution over the whole population)
nor repetition of transactions between identical partners, this coordination
problem has to be resolved by an evolutionary bargaining process based on
reference to observable characteristics of other, similar agreements.
More and more precise information on the probability distribution of the
match values of ex ante identical jobs is obtained from periodic assessments of
the productivity of a worker. Due to a decreasing variance of expected match30
values, incentives to switch to another job or to employ another worker are
increasing over time.
It is shown that the residential location decisions of workers under these
conditions imply a stable localized labor market in the sense that firms are
unable to meet labor supply outside a cluster within a certain distance around
the cluster that depends on the number of employment opportunities and costs
of residential relocation. The conditions for a single cluster equilibrium are
identified.31
Appendix. Computation of the minimum resistance between m-records
I
f S = {(xt_m+1,yt_ra+1 ),(xt_ra+2,y,_ra+2 ),-••>(x.t, y ()} is some state and
S
I={(xt_m+2,y1_m+2),(xt_ra+3,yt_m+.,),...,(xt+,,y1+I)}is a successor of s, an
employer has made a mistake in the transition s —> s
1 if xt+i is not a best reply
for any of the employers to any sample of the size kn drawn from s. Similarly,
yl+i is a mistake if, for every worker, it is not a best reply to any sample of size
kw drawn from s. The minimum number of mistakes required to move from one
state s to a successor s' in a one-period transition is called the resistance r(s,s').
It can take on the values 0, 1 or 2. The values for the resistances are computed
by solving a shortest path problem on a directed graph (where the edges are




n be the absorbing states of P°. Due to the above convergence
result there is no transition from any x
1 to x^ (i^j) with zero resistance There
must be however at least one path between these state with positive resistance
since the perturbed process F* is irreducible. Each of the absorbing states
contains identical records which establish a fixed division rule. We.now define
a graph G which is composed of the absorbing states x
1 (i - -l,2,...,n) as
vertices and a directed graph from every vertex to every other. The graph is
turned into a network by weighting the edges by the resistances r(x,x') of
moving from one fixed division rule to another.
A state is then stochastically stable if s = x contains only identical elements
and has minimum stochastic potential among all x (Young 1993a, Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2).32
To compute the minimum resistance one has to constmct a directed graph in
which every state is a vertex, containing an edge from s to s' if and only if s' is
a successor of s. r(s,s') is the weight attached to the edges of the directed
graph.
Let G be another graph containing a vertex for each s with identical
elements, denoted by x, corresponding to the absorbing classes of P.°, and a
directed edge from very vertex to every other To each of the edges we assign
the weight r(x,x'). For each fixed vertex k (1 < k < n), define a k-tree to be a
spanning tree in G such that all paths lead to k. The resistance of a k-tree T is
the sum of the resistances of its edges: r(T) = ]!T r(x, x
1).
N.x'eG





The sequence of stationary distributions JU
I
: converges to a stationary
distribution•)/ of P° as 8 -> 0. Moreover, s is stochastically stable {]x" > 0) if
and only if s - x, i.e. contains only identical records, and y(x) has minimum
stochastic potential among all such vectors of identical records. Such an x
implies a stable division rule that resolves the coordination problem of an
employer and a worker initiating a labor relation.
In the sequel it will be shown how such a stable division rule is determined
by the size of the samples of the employers and the workers as well as by the
composition of these groups. To do so we first have to find out how to compute33
the minimum resistance between any two states characterized by m identical
records. Secondly it is explained how a division (x,l-x) is stochastically stable
if and only if x maximizes the minimum resistance between any pair of m
vectors of identical records.
Let a be a rational fraction (0 < a < 1) of the last m records that is sampled
by the employers. We start out from the assumption that all employers have
identical utility functions u(x), u being a concave function defined for all x e
[0,1]. The workers are assumed to sample fraction b of the last m records and
to have a concave utility function v(l-x) defined for all x e [0,1]. in is chosen
such that ma and mb are integer. Without loss of generality we can assume that
a > b. k = ma be the absolute number of records sampled by the employers.
Under the condition that both of the types of agents don't sample more than half
of the surviving records there exists at least one and at most two generically
stable divisions.
The set of the feasible demands is fixed by the choice of the precision 5 =
10"
p, p being a positive integer, D° - {x e D: 5 < x < 1-8). For every real
number r let [r] denote the least integer greater than or equal to r.
Minimum resistance between m-vectors of identical records
We first have to find out how we can determine the minimum resistance
between any two states (vectors of m identical records). For the transition from
one m record of identical records to another one the employers, the workers or
both have to (mistakenly) deviate from the division rule (x,l-x) that has become
conventional. That is, they make demands that do not correspond to the best
reply rule in equation (1). A mistake could consist of demanding more than is34
conventional or by demanding less. Suppose the process is at the convention x
e D°. Let \j/ be the path of minimum resistance form x to a state s that is in
some other basin. v|/ must then go through some other state s such that the
employers' best reply is different from x or the workers' best reply is different
form (1-x). Let s be the first of such states. If an employer's best reply to a
sample a is x' * x then by choice of s some of the workers must have made a
mistake by demanding a share different from (1-x). Let i < k be the number of
mistakes contained in the sample a of the employer. We construct another
sample a' of the employer where we replace all the mistakes that have been
made by the workers in a by the demand (1-x'). As the employer's best reply to
a was x' this holds a forteriori for the sample a'.
We now construct an alternative path i|/' from x to the x
f-basin in which the
total number of mistakes is i. If ij/ had been a transition path to x' this must then
also hold for the path \j/: Beginning at the m-vector x let a succession of
workers mistakenly demand 1 -x' in a row. For any employer who is matched in
the next period will sample the most recent k records with positive probability
this sample a" consists of i elements (1-x
1) and (k-i) elements of (1-x). The
relative frequency of mistakes is the same as in the sample a'. If all employers
have the same utility function, and x' has been a best reply in the first place to
a', it follows that x' is also the best reply by any other employer to the sample
a".
With positive probability the landlords will sample a" for k periods in
succession and reply with x' each time. The workers who sample the most35
recent records will then observe a sample that contains only the demands x'. As
there is a positive probability that a succession of k workers will sample from
this run, and consequently ask for 1 -x' for k rounds in a row. It follows that the
process converges with positive probability to the m vector x
1 with no further
mistakes.
To compute the minimum resistance for a transition from x to every x
1 we
have to consider for every x' * x the least number of initial mistakes (1 -x
1)
which would imply best responses of x' by the employers, and the least number
of initial mistakes x' by the employers that would cause a worker to reply with
1-x'. The smaller of these two number would give the minimum resistance.
Choosing an arbitrary x
1 * x, we have to distinguish two cases, a transition to a
new division rule which implies a smaller share of the employers or a transition
rule associated with a higher share of the employers.
Transition to a .smaller share of the employers
First the employers can make-the bad mistake of demanding x' < x i times in a
row which causes some workers to switch to the demand (1 -x') instead of (1 -x).
i can be smaller than the entire sample size of the workers mb. It follows from
equations (1) and (2) that if the workers observe i demands x' and (mb-i)
demands x they switch to the demand (1-x
1) if (i/mb)v(l-x') > v( 1-x), or
i>mb - - \£)
v(l-x')
The minimum value of i occurs if the employers would make the worst mistake
and demand the smallest possible x' = 5:36
- x)
A second possibility is that the workers by mistake demand a higher share than
what is a best reply to their samples when starting from x Suppose that a
succession of j < k = ma workers erroneously demand (1 -x'). An employer who







Over all feasible x' < x, the minimum such j occurs when x' - x-8.
Consequently, the minimum resistance is equal to
f, u(x5))
j = ma 1 —-- (5
1)
u(x) )
Transition to a larger share of the employers
Similarly the employers could make demands which are higlier than the best
replies to the samples containing k times the element (1-x). If the employers
make i mistaken demands of x', then some workers will switch to a lower (1-x
1)
provided that
The minimum number of mistakes to leave x is associated with the smallest
deviation from the conventional demand, when x' = x+5:37
(T)
v(l - x







Tlie minimum number of mistakes is required if the mistaken demands 1 -x' are




Let [r] denote the smallest integer greater than or equal to r. Combining (7) to











The fourth term can be omitted as it is at least as large as the second term
for all x e D°. (Young 1993b, p. 160). A peculiar division is generically stable
if and only if x maximizes the function ro(x) on D°.39
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